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OUtpLIt. This idea was the basis for the theory of "capital  capital fundamentalists would find attractive: that
fundamentalism."  differences in national patterns o' physical capital
Under this view, differences in national stocks of  accumulation can explain many differences in levels of
capital were the primary determinants of differences in  national product, and that increases in national
levels of national product. Capital fundamentalists  investment rates can produce major increases in rates of
viewed capital accumulation as central to increasing the  economic growth.
rate of economic growth. Evidence to support this view  King and Levine found that although the capital-
was based mostly on case studies of less developed  output ratio varies positively with the level of per capita
countries.  income, there is little support  for the view that capital
Since the rise of capital fundamentalism, problems of  fundamentalism should guide the agenda for research
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cause economic growth.
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Few economic ideas are as intuitive as the notion that increasing investment is the
best way to raise future output, either for an individual or a nation.  In the 1950's and
1960's, this idea formed the basis for the d3minant theory of economic development,
sometimes termed "capital fundamentalism". UJnder  this view, differences in national stocks
of capital were the primary determinants of differences in levels of national product.
Correspondingly,  capital fundamentalsts viewed rapid capital accumulation as central to
increasing the rate of economic growth.  Capital fundamentalism  provided a coherent
foundation for giving advice on development problems: national and international policies
designed to increase a nation's physical capital stock were the best way to foster economic
development.
Since the capital fundamentalist  view held sway, the problems of economic
development and economic growth have twice thrust themselves onto center stage of the
economic research agenda.'  In the first of these episodes, neoclassical growth theory and
growth accounting research in the 1950's and 1960's indicated that differences in patterns
of investment and capital formation were not the major factors which led nations to be rich
or poor, to be fast-growing  or slow-growing. These findings suggested that improvements
in technology - not capital accumulation - drive improvements  in living standards in the
long-run.  But since most of the evidence for capital fundamentalism  was based on case
studies of mainly less-developed  countries, while most of the contrary evidence was
obtained for advarnced  countries, aspects of capital fundamentalism  lived on in development
economics.
The second of these episodes, the recent explosion  of research on growth and2
development, has reinstated elements of capital fundamentalism  at the forefront of economic
and policy discussions.  In particular, recent research has lent support to two conclusions
the capital fundamentalists would find attractive: (i) that differences  in national patterns of
physical capital accumulation can explain much of differences in levels of national product;
and (ii) that increases in national investment rates can r.-oduce major increases in rates of
economic growth.
Our objective in this paper is to critically evaluate the roles of inve-anent and
physical capital accumulation  in economic growth and development. In particular, we want
to learn whether a modem version of capital fundamentalism  should serve as a guiding
principle for economic research and economic policy advice.  We thus work through the
findings of the two major episodes of economic research discussed above.  This discussion
is placed in a historical context since, on each occasion, there has been an interaction of
theoretical and empirical research with pressing policy issues. Empirically,  we construct
new measures of capital stocks for a large sample of countries, and carry out growth
accounting exercises in the spirit of earlier analyses.  In this way, we provide new, direct
evidence on the potential fruitfulness of capital fundamentalism.
The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 presents the original capital
fundamentalist view.  In section 3, we review the well-known "growth accounting" findings
of Solow (1957), Denison (1962, 1967),  and Maddison (1982) and the less well-known
development accounting findings of Denison (1967).  Section 4 discusses and implements
three methods for estimating capital stocks for 112 countries drawn from the Summers and
Heston (1991) data set and also provides the results of development  and growth accounting
exercises for these countries.  In section 5, we review how recent research fits into the3
debate concerning the importance  of physical capital accumulation  and economic growth.
Section 6 concludes.
We draw three major conclusions. First, there are empixically  important cross-
country variations in patterns of capital accumulation. For example, with several different
methe4s of estimating caHital  stocks, we find that capital-output ratios are strongly
positively associated with the level of economic development. Second, variations in
national pattems of capital formation explain little of the differences in national output
levels, when we impose the production function restrictions used by the accountants of
growth and development. Third. while there is a strong and robust correlation of the
investment rate and the growth rate in the intemational cross-section, there is little reason to
believe that this constitutes evidence that higher investment rates cause increases in growth
rates.  Overall, our results lead us to conclude that capital accumulation  is not a
fundamental cause of economic growth and development;  rather, it is one important feature
of these processes.4
2.  Capital Fundamentalism  in Theory and Practice
Capital fundamentalism  embodies the belief that the rate of physical capital
accumulation is the crucial determinant of economic growth.  The Harrod (1939)-Domar
(1946) growth model formed the original theoretical basis for capital fundamentalism. In
the Harrod-Domar  frarnework,  there was a fixed capital requirement per unit of output,
K = K. Y, where K is the stock of capital, Y is the flow of output. and K is the capital-
output ratio.  Hence, if an economy undertook at date  t  a given rate of net investment,
sYt = dK/dt for some s > 0, the implications for output growth would be:
(1)  (dY/dt)/Y,  =  S/K.
For example, with a capital-output  ratio of 3 and a net investment rate of 0.09, the
economy grows at 3% per year.  But if  s  were 0.03, the rate of growth would be just 1%.
Consequently,  variations in net investment rates could importantly determine the rate of
growth.  Measurement  of the capital-output  ratio, K,  became important because its value
dictated the size of the effect of the rate of investment on economic growth.
An important difficulty with this theory of long-run growth was its implication for
employment,  which gave rise to the Harrod-Domar  consistency  condition. If one posited
that employment growth ultimately was constrained by population growth, then the
experiment above (exogenous variation in s) was not possible.  To see this, let il denote the
population growth rate; then steady state growth onlv arises if
(2)  s =  f.5
Solow (1956) argued that (i) employment must grow at the same rate as population
in the long run; and (ii) steady-state growth appeared to be a good first approximation to
reality.  Hence, the Harrod-Domar consistency condition (equation (2)) ruled out the
independent  variation in net investment rates considered above.  It was this "knife-edge"
character of the Harrod-Domar  steady state that motivated Solow to develop the
neoclassical growth model.  Solow's theory featured a production function with smooth
substitution between factors of production in contrast to the fixed proportions structure of
the Harrod-Domar  model.  Solow's production function implied that capital-output ratios
could vary across time and countries ir. response to variations in saving behavior.
Arthur Lewis, perhaps the leading proponent of capital fundamentalism,  took the
Harrod-Oomar  model and went in a different direction from that of Solow (1956).  Lewvis
(1954) saw condition (2) as empirically irrelevant for developing  countries: Lewis (1954)
articulated an alternative view in which growth took place in a setting with unlimited
supplies of labor.  In this setting, capital accumulation  was fundamnental  to growth:
The central problem in the theory of economic  development is
to understand the process by which a community which was
previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its national
income or less, converts itself into an economy where
voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 percent of
national income or more.  This is the central problem because
the central fact of development is rapid capital accumulation
(including knowledge and skills with capital). We cannot
explain any "industrial"  revolution (as the economic historians
pretend to do) until we can explain why saving increased
relatively to national income. (p. 155).
Lewis found the resolution to this problem in changes in income distribution toward6
those with higher marginal propensities  to save.  He argued that:
...saving increases relatively to the national incomes because
the incomes of the savers increase relatively to the national
income.  The central fact of economic development is that the
distribution of incomes is altered in favor of the saving class."
(pp. 156-157)
Although Lewis does not systematically  present evidence to support 'tis view, he uses
anecdotal accounts from England. the United States, Japan, India, and the U.S.S.R.
Similarly, the economic historiaki  W.W. Rostow (1960) argued that a sharp jump in
the investment rate was necessary to achieve sustained growth.  Specifically, in describing
the five stages of economic development,  Rostow posited that countries begin from a stage
where "...a ceiling existed on the level of attainable output per head..."  (p.4).  Then there is
a period of "take-off" where
...  the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally
overcome.  The forces making for economic progress, which
yielded limited bursts and enclaves of modem activity, expand
and come to dominate  the society.  Growth becomes its normal
condition. (p.7)
As with Lewis. Rostow (1960) saw physical capital accumulation  as the fundamental
determinant of economic take-off:
...a necessary but not sufficient condition for the take-off... that
the proportion of net investment  to national income (or net
national product) rises from, say, 5% to over 10%... (p.9 )
In The World Economy: History and Prospect, Rostow discuses the economic development
of twenty countries and how they conform to his five stages of development.7
Thus, an influential strand of the development literature focused on the investment
rate as a key factor in steady growth.  As noted by Yotopoulos  and Nugent (1976) and
Gillis. et.al. (1992), capital fundamentalism  furnished a coherent foundation for
development strategies: it was possible to accelerate economic development by increasing
domestic physical capital accumulation. Clearly, foreign aid donors and advisers could play
a crucial role in implementing this development strategy. In fact, Yotopoulos and Nugent
(1976) list evidence that international  organizations  during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
implemented  a battery of policies that embodied the principles of capital fundamentalism. 2
More recently, capital fundamentalism  has returned to the forefront of economic
research and policy prescriptions. Romer (1986, 1987),  for example, develops an
endogenous growth model in which there are large externalities to capital.  Although not
stated directly, Romer's analysis implies an assumption that it is exogenous clianges in the
rate of capital accumulation in combination  with a very large elasticity of output with
respect to capital accumulation that drives economic growth.  Similarly,  the analysis by
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) suggests a very important role for capital in explaining
differences in cross-country differences in output per person.
More explicitly, DeLong and Summers (1992, p.114) have recently restated the
capital fundamentalist  doctrine:
We are led to conclude that policies to boost the share of
output devoted to investment in general are worth undertaking
on their own terms: they do promise benefits worth more than
their costs.8
But, DeLcng and Summers (1992, pp. 94) do refine their view:
International  comparison suggest a special role for equipment
investment  as a trigger of productivity growth.  ... equipment
investment should receive special incentives.
Given current and historic interest with the role of physical capital accumulation in
explaining economic growth. the remainder of this paper examines whether capital
fundamentalism  should guide public policy recommendations  and research strategies.
3.  Development znd Growth Accounting: I
I'his section reviews two types of accounting  exercises undertaken by Denison
(1962, 1967), which built on earlier work by Solow (1957).3 For a group of nine
countries, Denison asked the develoDment  accounting question: what part of cross-country
differences in income per capita is accounted for by differt.aces in physical capital per
capita; Der.ison  also asked the growth accountine question: what part of cross-country
differences in growth rates of output is accounted for by differences in growth rates of
capital per capita.  Although with considerable  debate, 4 Denison and others found that (1)
differences in the level of physical capital per person accounted for very little (about 25
percent) of the differences in income per capita across industrialized  countries and (2)
differences in the rate of physical capital accumulation  per person accounted for a similarly
small amount of the differences in growth rates of income per capita across nine
industrialized  countries.  These results suggest a much smaller role for physical capital9
accumulation in economic development  and growth than that advanced by capital
fundamentalists.
3.1  Development  and Growth Accounting: Framework
The organizing principle of both development and growth accounting is the Cobb-
Douglas aggregate production function. We begin with a discussion of how the Solow-
Denison-Maddison  (SDM) accounting framework employed this specification.
Suppose that the level of national output, Y for a country with N citizens can be
written as a constant-returns-to-scale  function of capital and labor input:
(3)  Y = AKG(nN)I",
where K is the capital stock; n is the number of units of labor input per person (reflecting
work pattems, extent of human capital accumulation, etc.), and A and a  are technical
parameters. Under perfect competition,  the parameter a  will be the share of capital income
in natinnal produlct.
Countries clearly differ in population size, so that a natural starting point is to
normalize country output by scaling by population  or the number of workers.  Letting
y=Y/N denote output per person, and k=K/N denote capital per person, output per person
is:
(4)  y = A kanI".10
The standard procedL.; in growth accounting (where the period-to-period changes in
inputs and outputs are small) is to divide output growth into components  attributable to
changes in factors of production, i.e.,
(5)  (&y/y) = (&A/A)  + a  (&kIk) + (1-a) (&n/n),
based on a specific value of a.  As an example, suppose that the growth rate of output per
person was 4%, the capital growth rate was 6%, there was no growth in n and the share of
capital was .33.  Then 2% of output growth is attributed to capital growth, and the
remaining 2% is attributed to growth in "total factor productivity", i.e., to the residual
a6A/A. This procedure was used by Solow (1957) to explore the evolution of economic
activity within a country.  It was also used to make intemational comparisons  of rates of
growth by Maddison (1982) and Denison (1967).
It is also possible to undertake development accounting on the basis of the
production function. That is. we can take the ratio of two national measures of output per
person, using equation (4):
(6)  [yi/yj]  = [Ai/Aj]  [k,/kj] [n/nj]'-a.
Given data on relative quantities  of factors production, we can measure cross-country
differences in total factor productivity,  A,/A,, as residuals: [A,/Aj]  = [y,/yj]/([k/kj]'[n,/nj]")-
To describe the extent to which capital accounts for cross-country  differences in output, we11
begin by constructing the ratio:
(7)  Oki=  a  log(k,/k,) / log(y 1/y;).
The ratio Oki is the fraction of differences in national output levels due to capital.  This
measure has the following desirable properties. First, if a similar procedure is applied to all
of the components of international  output differences,  then contributions  of components
sum to 1.  Second. this measure of the contribution  of capital is linear in capital's share, so
that we can easily investigate the consequences  of alterations in this parameter. Further,
this measure may be rewritten as follows:
(8)  Oki = a  +  a  1Og(Kj/Ki) /  log(yi/y;)
using the fact that log(ki/ki) = log(Ki/Kc)  + log(y 1/yj). Thus if capital-output ratios were the
same across countries Ok would equal a.
To describe the "sources of development,"  we first calculate the percentage shortfall
in output for country i relative to the reference country  j: Pi = 1OO*(yj-yi)/yj.  Then, we
construct our contribution  of capital to the level of development as PiOki.  This development
accounting method is based on one used by Denison; it differs at most in minor details.
3.2  Denison's Findings on Growth and Development
In his classic (1967) study, Why Do Growth Rates Differ?. Denison compared U.S.12
development in 1960 and growth over 1950-1962  to that in eight European countries
(Belgium,  Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and
Italy). Then, as now, there was a concern in the U.S. over the rate of economic growth;
comparison  with the faster growing countries of Europe suggested one avenue for
potentially understanding  how U.S. growth might be increased.
Like other growth accounting experts, Denison was highly concerned with the
difficulties inherent in producing indices of labor and capital input, so that descriptions of
the procedures involved in this process form a central part of his report.  For labor, this
index included  adjustments for hours worked; for education; and for age-sex composition.
For capital, these indices aggregated diverse types of capital, including dwellings, non-
residential structures, equipment, inventories. But, also like other growth accountants,
Denison also saw the value of producing summary numbers so that the salient facts of the
growth process could be readily communicated. The SDM accounting framework led to a
remarkably consistent view of the sources of development and growth.
3.3  Accounting  versus Explanation
There are limits to what can be learned from growth accounting by its very nature.
For example, consider the conclusion from Solow (1957) that 1/8 of the long term variation
in output per worker is capital accumulation and 7/8 is a productivity  residual interpreted as
technical progress. In Solow's (1956) model, a steady increase in technology at the rate y
will lead to increases in output per worker and in capital per worker at a commoli rate y.
Growth accounting  will attribute (ay) of this increase to capital formation and ((l-a)y) of13
this increase to exogenous technical change.  The growth accounting procedure will
therefore state that capital accumulation accounts for a*100 percent of economic growth
even though the growth in capital was an endogenous response to exogenous technical
change.  Herce. Denison's question "why do growth rates differ?" is a little misleading.
Probably it should be "how do growth rates differ?"  Yet, even with this caveat, growth and
development accounting provide information  on the historical association between capital
and both the level of development and the rate of growth.  The next two subsections review
this evidence.
3.4  Development  Accounting.  The Sources of International  Differences  in Income  Levels
We will begin by reviewing the least familiar of these two topics: the international
comparison of the level of economic development. First, Denison (1967) produced
estimates of output per worker (y) and capital per worker (k) that were comparable to
measures that he (in his (1962) work) and others had constructed for studying economic
growth in the U.S.  For example, Denison found that Italy had about 40% of the output per
worker of the U.S. output per worker and about 61% of U.S. capital per worker in 1960.
Although the levels of y and k differed importantly  across countries, Denison found that k/y
was remarkably constant across countries, which confirmed  earlier work by Kaldor (1961).
Second, Denison investigated what fraction of international  differences in output per
worker (y) could be attributed to differences in capital per worker (k), labor input per
worker (n); and the total factor productivity residual (A). Cross-national  differences in
labor input (per employed individual) were estimated to be small so that these were viewed14
as not quantitatively important.
While cross-country differences in capital per worker were large, these differences
did not account for much of the international  differences in output per worker.  Figure I
displays these differences in a dramatic way.  For each country, we see the extent of the
shortfall from the U.S. level.  For most countries, this value is around 40%, meaning that a
typical country had output per worker of about 60% of the U.S. level.  Of this shortfall, the
contribution  of capital per worker is typically about 10%, indicating that about one quarter
of the shortfall is attributed to capital.  Fundamentally,  this reflects the fact that capital's
share in the production function is small.  However, since Denison's measurements are
based on the aggregation of several capital stocks, a single value of a  is not imposed (as in
the specification  of equation (8) above); Denison's implicit value is about 0.25.
3.5  Growth Accounting. The Sources of International  Differences in Economic Growth
Working with data on the United States, Solow (1957) found that only a small
fraction of long-term U.S. growth in output per worker could be accounted for by increases
in capital per worker.  Classic studies by Maddison (1982) and Denison (1967) showed that
this finding also held for various European  countries over the long term and the immediate
post war period.  While Denison found that each country in his nine country sample tended
to have capital growth rates that equalled output growth rates, the growth accounting results
in Figure 2 show that growth in capital per worker accounts for only a small portion of the
growth in output per worker.  As with the development accounting exercise (see Figure 1),15
no more than one quarter of growth is accounted for by capital formation. Solow's (1957)
findings for the United States were thus dramatically confirmed for European countries.
3.6  Conclusions from  Earlier Development  and Growth Accounting
These two exercises suggested that there may be a common problem to be solved in
studying growth and development economics. In asking why it was that some countries
were poorer than others, Denison and others found that the answer did not lie in
international  differences in quantities  of the factors of production, but rather in an
unexplained  productivity factor.  In asking why it was that some countries grew faster than
others, they also found that international  differences in growth rates of the factors of
production were not the answer. This suggested that there could be a common explanation
of the growth and development phenomena,  but did not point to a specific solution.
However, these complementary results did indicate that the explanation  proposed by the
capital fundamentalists  was strongly ruled out: international  differences in patterns of
physical capital accumulation did not account for much of the differences in levels of
development  or rates of growth.
The section also emphasized  a crucial distinction worth repeating. These growth
accounting exercises are just that, accounting exercises. There is no presumption of a
causal behavioral relationship.  Exogenous  increases in technology could cause both output
and capital to grow.  These growth accounting exercises would then mechanically associate
the fraction a  of output growth to capital accumulation. Thus, even if Denison had found
that capital accounted for a large fraction of development and growth differences, these16
growth accounting exercises alone would not imply an exploitable causal relationship from
capital to growth.
These growth accounting results did not stop many development economists,
however, from continuing to emphasize physical capital accumulation  as a policy objective
to promote economic growth.  As noted by Sen (1983), the traditional wisdom of
development economists still involves the idea that the rate of economic growth is largely
dependent on the savings rate.  Perhaps one reason development economists  rejected the
SDM growth accounting results is that the SDM growth accounting results were based on
industrialized  country data and not on data from developing countries.
4.  Development  and Growth Accounting:  New Evidence
This section takes the development and growth accounting procedures conducted by
Denison thirty years ago on nine OECD countries and applies them to a broad cross-section
of over 100 developed and developing countries. To examine the relationship between
physical capital and the level of economic development for a broad cross-section of
countries, we need measures of physical capital stocks at a point in time.  To study the
relationship between physical capital accumulation and economic growth, we need time
series estimates of physical capital for the cross-section  of countries.  Direct survey
estimates of capital stocks are generally  not available. Therefore, we first estimate capital
stocks from Summers and Heston's (1991) constant-price  investment series which runs
from 1950-1988 for most countries.  Since the data and methods for computing capital17
stocks are potentially fraught with error, the ensuing computations should be interpreted
with even more reservations  than usual as emphasized  by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).
Nonetheless, we believe that expanding the study of the relationship  between physical
capital and growth to a broad range of countries provides compensating  remuneration.
After computing  and summarizing  our capital stock figures, the second part of this
section reexamines one of  Kaldor's (1961) "stylized facts."  We examine whether capital-
output ratios are constant across countries.  We find that the capital-output ratio varies
positively and significantly  with income per capita.  Richer countries have higher capital-
output ratios.  This is consistent with findings by Nehru and Dhareshwar  (1993), but
inconsistent with those of Kaldor (1961) and Romer (1989).  Since a constant capital-output
ratio forms the basis of most growth models, this finding may have unsettling implications
for our theories of economic growth.
The third and fourth parts of this section conduct the Denison-style development and
growth accounting discussed above.  We find that the level of capital per person accounts
for more of the differences in output per person in our sample (between 28 and 59 percent)
than in the Denison sample of nine OECD countries (about 25 percent).  We find that
growth in capital accounts for about 40 percent of income per capita growth rates.
Although we find a larger role for capital, the differences between our findings and
Denison's seem to reflect our use of a much higher capital share parameter (0.4) than
Denison's (0.25) rather than a closer association between capital and economic development
and growth in our sample of countries.18
4.1  Computing Capital Stock Estimates
We use three methods for computing capital stock estimates from the Summers and
Heston investment data.  The first method assumes that each country is continually at a
steady state with a constant capital-output ratio.  The second two methods use the standard
perpetual inventory method of estimating capital stocks with different guesses at the initial
capital stock.  The advantage of the steady-state  estimate is that we do not have to assume
anything about the initial capital stock; its weakness is that it assumes a constant capital-
output ratio.  In contrast, the perpetual inventory method requires an initial capital stock
number; its strength is that it does not require assumptions about the ratios we want to
study.'
4.1.1  Steady-State Estimates
The steady-state  estimate of the capital stock is based on the assumption that the
capital-output ratio is constant, which implies that dK/K, = dY/Y,.  Consequently,
since dK, = 1, - 8  Kt, then dK/K, = I/K, - 8, where It is gross investment and 8  is capital's
depreciation rate.  We also define the growth rate yt = dY/Y, = I 1/K,  - 6.  Letting i equal the
investment rate, I/Yt, the steady-state  capital-output ratio for country  j is
(9)  -Kj  =  _j/[8tj]
Given estimates of country  j's  steady-state  investment rate, i, growth rate, I,, and
depreciation rate, 8, we compute the steady-state capital-output ratio.  Notice that this19
construction assumes that the capital-output ratio is constant within a country, but not
necessarily across countries.  Given the nature of this steady-state  estimate, we primarily
use it as benchmark indicator of differences in capital formation across countries.
Throughout  our analysis we assume that 8 is constant across countries and time at
0.07 per year, while recognizing that there is some controversy  about 8's value and
constancy (e.g. Romer (1989) and Scott (1989)). We use each country's investment rate in
the 1980's for ij . To compute the steady-state  growth rate of country  j in the 1980's, we
use a weighted average growth rate.  Specifically,  we set the steady-state  growth rate of
country j as
(10)  Yj  = x .J + (1-X)Yw
where y, is country  j's  growth rate over the 1980's y.  is the world growth rate over the last
thirty years (0.04), and A is a parameter that governs the relative weight we place on the
country's own experience.  We set k=0.25 based on the work by Easterly, et al. (1993),
which documents a mean-reversion  tendency in growth rates of this magnitude. Thus,
given y,, 8, and i, we estimate ij.  Then, using average GDP in the 1980's, Yj, and
population in the 1980's, Nj, we compute the capital-per-person  ratio, K/N.
4.1.2  Perpetual Inventory Method, Setting Initial Capital to Zero
The standard perpetual inventory method of estimating capital stocks uses the
formula20
(11)  K,+,  = Ej0  oj  I.j + (1-8)' Ko
where Ko is the initial capital stock.  We use the investment series. 1950-1988,  constructed
by Summers and Heston.  Our first estimate using the perpetual inventory method sets K&=0
and accumulates forward.  We use this estimate to compute capital-output and capital-per-
person ratios in the 1980's.  Since the initial capital stock in 1950 only retains about five
percent of its original value in 1990 (using a seven percent depreciation rate), this method
may yield helpful estimates of K/Y and K/N in the 1980's.  The advantage of this approach
is that it simply accumulates investment. The disadvantages  are that (i) this method does
not produce a useful time series of capital stocks since the importance of the initial capital
stock estimate diminishes to what may be considered negligible levels very slowly, and (ii)
we can probably compute a better guess of the initial capital stock for countries than zero.
4.1.3  Perpetual  Inventory  Method.  Steady State Estimates of Initial  Capital
The second perpetual inventory method attempts to derive a better initial capital
estimate than zero for all countries by modifying a method suggested by Harberger (1978).
Better estimates of the initial capital stock will do more than produce slightly better
estimates of capital in the 1980's.  If one feels comfortable with the initial capital stock
estimate, then the long-run capital stock time series will permit us to study the relationship
between physical capital accumulation and economic  growth.  We compute initial capital by
using the steady-state  method to calculate an initial capital stock time-series.  Specifically,
recall that under the assumption that the capital-output  ratio is fixed, a  = ij/[8+j],  where i21
and y represent "steady-state" values.  To calculate the initial capital stock for a country, we
rewrite this formula as:
( 12)  Kjninha =  j  Yiji6&i
For countries where investment data begin in  1950, we compute the average investment rate
in the 1950's and use a weighted average growth rate to approximate the country's steady-
state growth rate.  Specifically, we use (5.2) with y 1 being country j's  growth rate over the
1950's, y.  is the world growth rate over the entire thirty year period (yw=0.04),  and X=0.25.
Thus we have the 1950's steady-state  capital-output ratio for country  j.
Now, to compute an estimate of the initial capital stock we need to multiply this
1950's steady-state  capital-output ratio by an estimate of initial output.  We use average
real output between 1950-1952  as an estimate of initial output, producing an estimate of the
initial capital stock in 1951. The perpetual inventory formula then produces a capital stock
time series for country j.  We apply this process to each country, beginning with the earliest
date points produced by Summers and Hes.&  . This procedure starts the initial capital stock
as far back as possible without allowing GDP in a single year to determine the initial
capital stock estimate.  We label this our "preferred measure" in the discussion below, as it
contains the positive features of each OI the methods discussed above.
4.2  Capital Stock Measurements: Summary Statistics
Our three measures of capital formation can be used to provide summary22
information on cross-country patterns of accumulation. We primarily use information
averaged over the 1980s since computed capital stocks in the 1980s are less sensitive to our
estimate of the initial capital stock. Table I provides summary statistics on average values
of the capital-output and capital-capita  ratios for various samples of countries.  In the
OECD, which includes the countries in Denison's study, we have an average capital-output
ratio of about 2.6 for the decade of the 1980's using our preferred method. But we find
that the alternative methods (using either the steady state assumption or the perpetual
inventory method with K. = 0) yield values that are broadly similar. Table I shows that,
for the decade of the 1980's. capital per worker was about $27,000 for the average member
of the OECD.  Fir the non-oil and non-OECD sample of 73 countries, capital per worker
averaged less than $5000.
When we look across regions of the world, using several groupings of countries, we
find that the capital-output ratio is substantially  smaller:  for example, the average value is
1.6 for the 73 countries that are neither members of the OECD nor major oil producers.
While these countries have capital-output ratios that are about 60% of the level in the
OECD, they have output per worker that averages about 25% of the OECD.
4.3  The Capital-Output  Ratio
To explore the association of capital-output ratios with the level of development
more systematically,  we regress the average capital-output ratio during the 1980s on the
ratio of income per capita relative to income per capita in the United States for the cross-
section of 105 non-oil countries. Hence, we are asking: did richer countries have higher23
capital-output ratios?  The regrecsion estimates are reported in Table 2 and show that the
slope parameter enters with a t-statistic of over 7.  Using our preferred capital measure, the
coefficient estimates imply that: (i) a very poor count;y typically has a capital-output ratio
of about 1.4; (ii) a country one half as rich as the U.S. typically has a capital output ratio of
about 2.2 and (iii) a country as rich as the U.S. typically has a capital output ratio of about
3.1.  Broadly similar patterns emerge for the capital ratios constructed using our other
measures: richer countries have higher capital-output ratios. 6
4.4.  Development  Accounting
We next pursue the development  accounting exercises undertaken by Denison.  We
break the sample of 105 non-oil countries into ten groups based on increasing levels of
capital per person.  We then compute average values of k=K/N and yY/N  for each decile
for the decade of the 1980s. We use as the reference value the average levels of y and k in
the tenth decile (i.e., the decile with the largest capital per person).  We then computed
decile i's  shortfall from the reference group, Pi, and the component attributable to cross-
country differences in capital OkiP,.  We found it desirable to implement the version of the
accounting that includes the separate effects of the level of output and the capital output
ratio, Oki  =  a  +  a  (log(xc/K 1 0)/log(y1/y 1 0).  Hence, in Figure 3, we have three components: a
capital share component (aP,); a capital-output ratio component a(log(KI/Kj 0)/log(yi/yj 0))Pi;
and the residual. Figure 3 shows that the shortfall of output range from 95% of the top
decile (for poorest countries) to about 28% (in the next-to-top decile).  We now discuss24
each component  of this decomposition.
4.4.1.  The Capital Share Component:
We use a value of a  = .4 to be conservative  in critiquing the potential contribution
of capital  accumulation to output.7 With this value, if the capital-output ratio were
constant,  development accounting  associates  0.4 Pi  of differences  in y with differences  in k
at every stage of development.  Hence, on these grounds, capital would account  for  11% =
0.4*28% of the 28% shortfall  for the decile 9 countries and  it would account  for 38% =
0.4*95%  of the 95% shortfall for poorest  countries (decile  1).
4.4.2.  The Capital-Output  Ratio Component
We have seen above that countries  with lower  values of y also have lower  values of
K = k/y.  The influence of this on development  accounting depends  directly on a.  But it
also depends  on the value of (log(Kj/K 10)/log(yj/yj0); the nine decile values of this ratio
component  range from  .50 (for decile  1) to .27 (for decile 9).  Hence, with a capital  share
of 0.4, there is an additional  19% = 0.4*0.50*95% component  attributed to capital  for
decile  I and an additional  3% = 0.4*0.27*28%  attributed to capital for decile 9.
4.4.3.  The Total Contribution  of Capital
Taking the two components  together, capital accounts for 56% = (0.4 + 0.19)*95%
of the 95% shortfall in development  for the poorest countries (decile  1) and
12% = (0.4 + 0.03)*28%  of the 28% of the shortfall in development  for the top group25
(decile 9).  Thus, capital accounts for between 43% and 59% of the differences in the level
of income per capital in our sample of io2 countries. Capital accounts for a greater share
of the shortfall in income per capita in poorer countries since capital-output ratios are
positively associated with income-per-person  ratios.
These effects of capital on the level of development  are more substantial than those
documented by Denison [1967]. One major factor in our finding of a stronger influence of
capital is that we are using a capital share parameter a=0.4, which is an upper bound of
measurements  for developed  countries: lower values of a (of about 0.25) are implicit in
Denison's results.  For example, if we dropped capital's share to .25, then variations in k
would account for 44% of the difference between income-per-capita  in decile I with
income-per-capita  in decile 10, and capital would account for only 28% of the difference
between decile 9 and 10.
4.5  Growth  Accounting
Given that our preferred method of measuring capital accumulation produces a time
series of capital stocks, we can explore the behavior of growth in capital per person and in
output per person in our non-oil sample.  To avoid too much dependence  on initial
conditions and on short-term economic fluctuations,  we look at these relations using data
from the 1980's.  The findings concur closely with those of Denison (1967).  We find that
growth in y and k move together with close to unit elasticity; and growth of capital per
person accounts for only a small portion of output growth. 8
The growth accounting  results are displayed in Figure 4.  Using deciles of growth26
in capital in the 1980's and a value of a=0.4, we find that growth in capital per person
accounts for about 40 percent of growth in output per person.  In contrast to the
experiences discussed in section 3 above, however, Figure 4 displays positive and negative
growth observations.  When output growth is negative, capital growth still tends to under-
account for output growth.  Interestingly,  deciles 3, 4 and 5 represent groups of countries
where capital stock growth was positive while output growth declined!
Recall that, if the growth rate in capital and output are close to each other then, by
definition, an a  value of 0.4 implies that 40% of growth in output per person is accounted
for by growth in capital per person  Although we find that the capital-output ratio is rising
in income, it is not rising fast enough to override this general characteristic  of the standard
growth accounting methodology. Put differently, expanding Denison's set of 9
industrialized countries to a broad cross-section  of over 100 countries does not change the
general growth accounting conclusion regarding capital fundamentalism:  capital
accumulation  accounts for only a small fraction of income growth, suggesting an important
role for technological  change. 9 These result, however, may not hold for all countries.  In a
very carefully done study, Young (1993) shows that the Newly Industrializing  Countries of
East Asia (NICs) are unusually rapid growers but have not enjoyed unusually rapid
productivity  growth.  He concludes that the static gains from rapid factor accumulation have
fueled economic growth over the last 20 years in the NICs.
4.6  Conclusions from  Our Development  and Growth Accounting  Exercises
In sum, we draw two conclusions from these development and growth accounting27
exercises.  First, the capital-output ratio does seem to be systematically  related to the level
of development. Second, we agree with Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) that Solow was
basically right about the sources of economic development and economic growth.
However, unlike these authors who agree with Solow's (1956) emphasis on a variable
capital-output ratio, it is Solow (1957) and the related work by Denison (1967) that we find
more compelling. We reach this conclusion on conservative grounds, assuming that the
share of capital is large by OECD standards. On the development side, cross-country
differences in capital-output ratios are associated with differences in levels of GDP per
capita, but this component is relatively small in an accounting sense.  Most of the
accounting contribution of capital per person to output per person simply reflects the
mechanical consequences of the assumed share of capital in production. Given the
mechanics of development accounting, this association could arise from any set of forces
that induce the levels of capital and output to increase.  On the growth side, our conclusions
mirror those of Solow and Denison: during the decade of the 1980s, growth in capital per
person and growth in income per person proceeded at roughly equal rates within countries,
but there were substantial cross-national  variations in these growth rates.  Growth in capital
per person typically accounts for less than 40 percent of growth in output per person.
5.  New Growth Theory and the Output-Capital  Linkage
The development and growth e.  )unting evidence suggests that an unexplained
residual - often labelled technological  change - is importantly associated with development
and growth.  New theoretical work by Romer (1990), Grossman  and Helpman (1991) and28
Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop formal models that view technical improvements  and
industrial innovation as the engines of economic growth.  This stands in sharp contrast to
capital fundamentalism's focus on capital accumulation. In light of the development and
growth accounting results and these recent theoretical  advances, can and should capital
fundamentalism  be revived?
Resuscitating  capital fundamentalism  would require (1)  rejecting or changing the
growth accounting equation and (2) making the behavioral assumption that capital causes
output rather than maintaining a purely mechanical accounting device.  Capital
fundamentalists  could view some recent models as vehicles for both changing the
parameters of the accounting equation and identifying a causal link from capital to output
and capital accumulation to growth.'° In light of new research, this section examines
whether capital fundamentalism  should be resuscitated. We conclude that the answer is no:
capital accumulation seems to be a part of the process of economic development and
growth not the igniting source; indeed, economic growth tends to proceed capital
accumulation, not the other way around.  As argued by the early growth accountants,
further research into understanding  technological  progress offers the best hope for designing
policies that will foster sustained  economic growth.
5.1  External Effects  of Capital Formation:
One approach that maintains a focus on capital accumulation is to highlight the
potential importance of external effects of capital accumulation. Romer (1986), for
example, divorces the elasticity of output with respec. to capital from the share parameter,29
a.  This is accomplished by writing the production function of individual  units (e.g., firms)
as y = Aka E, where E is a measure of the external effect, and then sets E = k'a  for a
representative firm.  In this setting, if one makes the identifying assumption that the driving
exogenous force is variation in the savings and investment rate, then we return to the
capital fundamentalist world: the rate of capital accumulation is the primary determinant of
economic growth.
While this possibility cannot be ruled out by aggregate evidence,  the validity of
external effects to capital must be strongly and credibly supported by microeconomic
evidence.  Thus far, however, firm and industry level studies do not, in general, find strong
capital externalities as noted in Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991) and Griliches (1988).
Furthermore, there do not appear to exist compelling reasons for making the
identifying assumption that capital accumulatation  is exogenous. One could just as easily
assume that technological  change, A, is the driving exogenous variable that simultaneously
determines the rate of output and physical capital growth.  Indeed, Benhabib and Jovanovic
(1991) show that same statistics that are used to justify the existence of capital externalities
can be obtained from models in which technology is exogenous and both capital and
income are endogenously determined.
Finally, it is worth noting that Romer (1993) describes the early external effect
models as simply an initial modeling device, subsequently supplanted by explicit models of
endogenous technical progress that point to specific, potentially measurable sources of
international differences in development. Thus, we are still left pointed away from capital
fundamentalism  and toward trying to better understand technological  progress as suggested30
by Schumpeter  (1911)  more than 80 years ago.
5.2  Augmented  Solow  Model
5.2.1  The Model
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) (henceforth MRW) argue that if the Solow model
is augmented to include human capital, then it does a good job of explaining differences in
income levels and growth rates.  MRW write the (per capita) production function as y = A
k'  hO  n' a,  where k is physical capital per person, h is human capital per person, and n is
raw labor per person.  Then, assuming that h = fk  across countries (so that human capital
moves one-for-one with physical capital), they arrive at a specification  in which measured
cross-country differences in physical capital effect output per person with an elasticity of
(a+,).  When MRW estimate this model, they obtain a parameter estimate on (a+>) of
close to 0.7 with an adjusted R' of about 0.8.  If one take capital as the driving exogenous
source of growth, then capital accumulation  can have large impacts on growth directly by
boosting output and indirectly by boosting human capital accumulation. Thus, this analysis
diminishes the importance of understanding  technological change.
5.2.2  Example
Before discussing some of the unresolved issues with this modei, it is worth
exemplifying the importance of the parameters and show how this mcdel highlights the role
of capital.  In conducting this experiment,  we presume that causality runs from capital to
output and consider the effects of different parameters. Specifically,  we focus on the
consequence  of change in the capital-output  ratio Kc  for the level of development. In31
particular, think of varying the capital-output  ratio relative to a benchmark country, then the
production function prediction is that yj/y 10 = [/1/K1 0]e, where 0 u a/(l-a).  In Table 1, we
previously documented that capital-output  ratios in Africa were about 58% of those in the
OECD.  With a=.4, 0 = 2/3 so that the predicted difference in levels of output per person is
Yafnc'Yylo  = (0.58)(2/3) = 0.69.  But instead of having 70 percent of the value of OECD output
per person, Africa has just 12 percent.  From this perspective, the international differences
in capital-output ratios documented in the prior section explain very minor part or t-.,
pattem of development. Put alternatively, if African countries were to raise their capital
output ratio to the mean OECD level, the implications for the level of their output per
worker would be that it would be 44% higher (since 1.72(23)  = 1.44). Starting from output
per person of $1293, this increase would be about $570: they would look more like Latin
America ($3613) but not much more like the OECD ($10,549).
However, if we were to use the estimates suggested by the work of MRW then the
results of this exercise would be dramatically  different.  For example, a value of a  = .7
would result in the finding that capital explained essentially all of the shortfall plotted in
Figure 3.  Further, consider increasing a country's capital-output  ratio from that of a typical
African country to that of a typical OECD country.  We would increase its level of output
per person by a factor of more than 3.4 (since 0 = .7/.3 = 2.33, and
Y/Y10  =  [Kk/Klo]e  =  1.7e  = 3.44.  With the levels discussed above, this would enable them to
easily surpass Latin America and move to 40% of the output per person in the OECD.
Thus, using an augmented capital share parameter of 0.7 and taking capital variations as
exogenous would reinstate capital as the driving force behind economic growth32
5.  2.3  Shortcomings
There are at least three important reasons for being wary about using the MRW
model to resurrect capital fundamentalism. First, as emphasized above, there do not seem
to be compelling  reasons to take capital accumulation or human capital accumulation as
exogenous.  Second, in the Solow and augmented-Solow  model, the explanatory power in a
cross-section  regression comes from transitional dynamics (or reverse causality).  But, King
and Rebelo (1993) show using a neoclassical growth model with various plausible
parameter values that the U.S. experience and post-war experience in Japan are inconsistent
with transitional dynanics playing an important role.
This argument suffers from a third complication. Many theories may be advanced
that posit different unobservable but potentially crucial factors of production which are
presumably  highly correlated with physical capital.  MRW choose human capital, but other
factors may also be important. For example, Parente and Prescott (1991) highlight the
effects of "organizational  capital" on development  within a framework that is, in important
respects, observationally  equivalent to MRW."  Furthermore,  Baumol, et. al. (1989) shows
that residual measures of technological change are highly correlated with the capital-labor
ratios in seven OECD countries over the period 1880-1979. Thus, as suggested by the
work of Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
and Aghion and Howitt (1992), capital accumulation  and technological change may be
intimately linked.  The direction of causality and the precise nature of this link, however,
are still unclear. The MRW results cannot yet be confidently used to minimize the role of
technological change and instead focus on factor accumulation. It will require systematic33
use of human capital measures - like those constructed by Barro and Lee (1993) and Nehru
and Dhareshwar (1993) - to lend empirical credence to the link between human and
physical capital, and additional work is certainly needed to understand how technological
change and institutional arrangements interact with capital accumulation and economic
growth.
5.3  Investment
One of the most interesting findings of recent empirical research is that the rate of
investment is robustly, positively correlated with the rate of economic growth in the
international cross-section. This positive correlation is interesting for three reasons.  First,
it is c nisistent  with the old capital fundamentalist  view of Lewis (1954) and Rostow
(1960).  Second, Romer (1987, 1989) argues that the correlation of growth rates and
investment rates is a robust stylized fact that models of growth and development should
seek to capture.  Third, DeLong and Summers (1992) and others have used estimates of
regression coefficients  of growth on investment rates to argue for potent growth effects of
policies designed to increase investmnent.
Levine and Renelt (1992) show that the investment rate is positively and robustly
correlated with long-run growth in a cross-section countries over the 1960-1989 period.
Investment typically enters with a coefficient of about 0.17 with a coefficient standard error
of 0.03.  Taking investment as exogenous, the estimated value indicates that country which
had an increase in its investment  rate from 0.18 (the mean of the world) to 0.24 (the mean
of the OECD) would increase its growth rate by (0.17)*(0.06)=1%,  or from 0.5% to 1.5%34
This is substantial. Notably, its more than half of the difference between world growth and
that in the OECD.
Recent evidence, however, suggests that this close association does not represent a
causal link running from investment to growth.  Carroll and Weil (1994) and Blomstrom,
Lipsey, and Zejan (1993) show that growth Granger causes savings and investment, but that
savings and investment do not Granger cause growth.' 2 This evidence makes it difficult to
maintain the capital fundamentalist  faith.
6  Conclusions
Although we found that the capital-output  ratio varies positively with the level of
income per capita, there is little support for the view that capital fundamentalism  should
guide our research agenda and policy advice. When we extend standard growth accounting
procedures to a broad sample of 105 countries, we confirm earlier findings: international
differences in capital-per-person  explain little of the differences in output-per-person  across
countries; and, growth in capital stocks accounts for little of output growth across countries.
Moreover,  while the ratio of investment  to GDP is strongly and robustly associated with
economic growth, there is little reason to believe that this constitutes  evidence that
increasing investment will cause faster growth.  Indeed, recent results indicate the opposite:
economic growth Granger-causes  investment and savings, not the other-way-around.
We agree with Kaldor's (1960, p.259) argument that capital accumulation is a
feature of economic growth not a fundamental  cause:35
... neither the proportion of income saved nor the rate of
growth of productivity  per man (nor, of course, the rate of
increase in population) are independent  variables with respect
to the rate of increase in production...
We hope that research into the economic, institutional,  and legal determinants underlying
innovation, human capital accumulation, and physical capital investment will improve our
ability to design policies that promote sustained  economic growth.36
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Endnotes
1. This statement should be qualified since researchers conducted substantial and insightful
work on development and growth not during these episodes.  Nonetheless, it seems fair to
conclude that the number of dissertations by PhD economic students at major universities on
development and growth has been much higher over the last 10 years than over the 10 years
before that.
2. We were alerted to the work of Yotopoulos  and Nugent (1976) by Blomstrom, Lipsey, and
Zejan (1993).
3. Also see Fabricant (1954) and Abramovitz (1956).
4.  See,  for exarnple, Jorgenson (1990), Jorgenson and  Fraumeni (1989), Jorgenson and
Griliches (1967), and Jorgenson, Gallop, and Fraumeni (1987).
5. See Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) for a thorough description and comparison of different
methods for computing capital stock series.
6. These results also hold when the independent variables is computed in  1980 instead of
averaged over  the  1980s.  Furthermore, we get  similar parameter estimates when these
regressions are run on the adjusted sample of non-oil countries that only includes countries
rated as C- or better in terms of data quality as defined by Summers and Heston (1991).
7. As noted above, a=0.4  is much larger than that implied in Denison's work (about 0.25.
Moreover, many authors use a parameter of  1/3 for capital's  share of  income.  Thus, we
believe a=0.4 may exaggerate the role of capital.  See Elias (1992) for country computations
of a  ir. a cross-section of Latin American countries.
8. For example, for the sample of 67 non-oil adjusted countries (i.e., excluding major oil
exporters and countries with data quality ranked less than C- by Summers and Heston (1991),
the annual growth rates of income per capita and capital per capita were both 14 percent. For
non-oil countries,  capital tended to grow faster than output,  9 percent as compared to 7 percent.
9. See Nishimizu and Page (1986).
10. The originators of some of these models do not make explicit identifying assumptions
regarding causality.
11. Similarly, Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991) use models which are linear in
capital (at least at higher stages of development). These authors, however, view the capital in
their models as including physical capital, human  capital, and technology. Thus, these models
cannot be viewed as capital fundamentalist  in nature.41
12. In an earlier paper, we found that the predictable  component  of investment  is not associated
with economic growth.  Specificall,  in a pooled cross section of about 80 countries with data
averaged over the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s,  and 1980s,  we found using instrumental  variables that
investment entered insignificantly. This is consistent with the Carrol and Weil (1994) and
Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1993) findings who use pooled data averaged over five year
periods.  See King and Levine (1993).Table  I
Capital-Output and Capital-Per-Person  Ratios in the  1980s
K/Y  K/Y  K/Y  KIN  K/N  K/N  Y/N
Steady  Perpetual  Perpetual  Steady  Perpetual  Perpetual  Real Per
State  Inventory  Inventory  State  Inventory  Inventory  Capita
K(0)=0  K(0)=Ko  K(0)=<  K(0)=Ko  GDP
ALL  1.94  1.81  1.87  11,517  10,013  10,353  4,631
[1051  (0.99)  (0.77)  (0.80)  (15,100)  (11,343)  (11,537)  (4,393)
Non-Oil  1.82  1.79  1.85  10,378  9,965  10,314  4,521
[971  (0.80)  (0.78)  (0.80)  (11,875)  (11,590)  (11,782)  (4,318)
Non-Oil Adjusted  2.02  1.98  2.02  14,431  13,979  14,330  6,135
[65]  (0.70)  (0.65)  (0.66)  (12,535)  (12,252)  (12,441)  (4,406)
Non-Oil Non-OECD  1.60  1.55  1.61  5,029  4,402  4,706  2,539
[731  (0.78)  (0.72)  (0.76)  (6,534)  (5,087)  (5,349)  (2,331)
OECD  2.51  2.54  2.59  26,651  26,885  27,374  10,549
[241  (0.38)  (0.37)  (0.38)  (9,369)  (9,093)  (9,293)  (3,229)
Latin America  2.02  1.75  1.79  8,149  6,027  6,547  3,613
[21]  (0.85)  (6.66)  (0.68)  (7,977)  (4,073)  (4,321)  (2.004)
Africa  1.36  1.40  1.49  2,264  2.  '7  2,202  1,293
[35]  (0.87)  (0.79)  (0.87)  (4,043)  (3,ti43)  (3,108)  (1,082)
Notes:
1. Steady-State: Assumes constant capital-outptit ratio in tlhe 1980s for each country.
2. Perpetual Inventory K(0): Accumulates real investment from  1950 (if possible) starting with initial capital equal to zero.
3. Perpetual Inventory K(0)=Ko: Accumulates real investment from  1950 (if possible) starting with initial capital estimate
that assumes a constant capital-output ratio in the first ten years for which there are investment data.
4. Standard errors in parentheses.  Number of countries in brackets.
5. Non-Oil Adjusted: Non-oil countries, excluding countries with data quality graded less than C- by Summers and Heston (1991).43
Table 2:
Stability of the Capital-Output Ratio With Respect to the Capital-Per-Person  Ratio
Regression:  Dependent Varable=  c  +  b(  GDP Per Capita Country i,  1980s
GDP Per Capita United States, 1980s
Dependent
Variable:  _
KJY  1.29  1.89
Steady-State  (0.09)  (0.25)
[14.04]  [7.54]
K/Y  1.30  1.77
Perpetual Inventory  (0.09)  (0.24)
K(0)=0  [14.76]  [7.44]
KIY  1.35  1.78
Perpetual Inventory  (0.10)  (0.26)
K(0)=Ko  [14.14]  [6.86]
Notes:
1.  Steady-State  Capital: Assumes constant capital-output  ratio in the 1980s for each
country.
2.  Perpetual Inventory K(0): Accumulates investment from 1950 (if possible) starting
with initial capital stock at zero.
3.  Perpetual Inventory K(0)=KO:  Accumulates real investment  from 1950 (if possible)
starting with initial capital estimate that assumes a constant capital-output ratio in the
first ten years for which there are investment data.
4.  Sample includes 105  Non-Oil Countries.
5.  Dependent and independent  variables are averages over the 1980-88  period.
6.  Standard errors in parentheses.  T-Statistics in brackets.44
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